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I. Introduction 
 In the summer of 1936, Karl Hoetzel made up his mind. He gathered his belongings, left 
his German hometown, and joined his friend aboard a train to the Saarland territory, where they 
would illegally make their way to French Alsace-Lorraine. After visiting his relatives there, 
Hoetzel continued on to Metz, then to Toulouse, where he and his friend connected with an old 
antifascist acquaintance and informed him of their plan. In the next few days, the three of them 
would cross over the Pyrenees and into Spain. They would need to be careful—talk of the 
Spanish war filled the air in France, leading guards to keep a tight watch over the border. 
Moreover, hostile anarcho-syndicalists controlled the Spanish borderland. Arriving in the 
southern town of Perpignan, the group split up so as not to attract attention. Finally, they hiked 
through rocky mountain passes and into Spanish territory. For the next two years, Hoetzel was 
exactly where he felt he needed to be. “As a German antifascist who had experienced fascism 
firsthand, it was clear to me that Spain’s cause was my cause.”1 
Karl Hoetzel was one of many foreign antifascists who left his home to fight for the 
Spanish Republic. Like his peers in Germany, he had been following the events in Spain through 
the illegal antifascist press. When Spain’s newly elected left-wing government, the Frente 
Popular, was threatened by Francisco Franco’s fascist uprising in 1936, Hoetzel resolved to take 
up arms in defense of democracy. He and his comrades were not alone. By the end of the war, 
roughly 59,000 antifascists had joined the defense. 
 
1 SAPMO-BArch, SgY 11/ V 237 13/ 207: Erlebnisberichte von in der DDR lebenden Spanienkämpfern nach 
Veröffentlichung des Appells der Sektion ehemaliger Spanienkämpfer, “Hoetzel, Karl,“ p. 65. All primary and 
secondary source translations are my own unless otherwise noted. 
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Among the large number of international fighters, roughly 2,800 Germans fled the Reich 
to play an active role in the war against Franco and his benefactor: Adolf Hitler. The Communist 
Party of Germany (KPD), the largest communist party outside of the Soviet Union, refocused its 
resistance operations on the Spanish war front. German communists, social democrats, and 
anarchists alike found an active community of antifascists that continued to develop in Spain 
throughout the war. On the front lines of the Spanish Civil War, German antifascists were no 
longer the suppressed minority that they were at home. Some Germans arrived in Spain early 
enough to join the existing community of German exiles, while others came after the formation 
of the International Brigades—an organization of Republican militias that drew support from 
volunteers across the globe. Altogether, German-speaking volunteers made up the second-largest 
troupe of foreign fighters, behind only their French counterparts. 
 When Hoetzel arrived in Spain in late August 1936, the conflict had begun so recently 
that he and his peers received only half of a uniform each. But already, he could see that that the 
Germans who joined the Spanish Civil War came from various backgrounds. Most of the 
volunteers were communists, though many were registered social democrats and some 
anarchists. A substantial minority of the volunteers were Jewish.2 Some of them had been trained 
militarily, either through service in the First World War or in communist militias, but many were 
simply untrained anti-Nazi ideologues. Regardless of their background, their conviction that the 
Spanish Civil War was an integral step in their own struggle was the common thread linking the 
soldiers together. 
 
2 For a detailed analysis of Jewish members of the International Brigades, see Arno Lustiger, Schalom Libertad!: 
Juden im spanischen Bürgerkrieg (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 1989). 
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 The unique importance of the Spanish Civil War to the German volunteers is often 
overlooked. To them, the war’s result bore significant consequences on their own struggle of 
resistance. Whereas other countries had not yet felt the impact of fascism, German communists 
and socialists were among the Nazis’ first political prisoners and exiles. Other foreign volunteers 
could often retreat to their homes, but Germans in exile could not return to their country. 
Additionally, the hopeful Germans rallied behind the war as proof that a popular antifascist front 
could emerge against Nazism. While many other foreigners fought for their ideals in Spain, 
Germans fought for their future. 
 From the very beginning, it was clear that the three-year war was a precursor to wider 
global turmoil. New international political movements clashed in a largely agrarian and 
relatively isolated country. Neither the Frente Popular, a coalition of leftist parties that had won 
the 1936 Spanish elections, nor Francisco Franco and the Nationalists were satisfied with the 
existing political system of the Spanish Republic.3 While the Frente Popular had its eyes set on 
revolution, the fascist Nationalists blamed the fall of the Spanish monarchy for the political 
chaos plaguing the country. Both sides were weak on their own and thus tied their causes to their 
international allies. Franco found early support from Mussolini and Hitler. The Republican 
government relied on the Communist International—a Stalinist association of communist parties 
that alleged to advance world communism, but primarily sought to maintain Soviet control over 
the international communist movement. The Communist International (Comintern) established 
the International Brigades in conjunction with the Frente Popular to recruit and organize foreign 
fighters for Europe’s first major conflict since the First World War. Individuals of all social 
 
3 R. Dan Richardson, Comintern Army: The International Brigades and the Spanish Civil War (Lexington, KY: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1982), p. 3. 
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classes and professions uprooted their lives to turn the tide against European fascism by enlisting 
in the Brigades. Among them were many authors, poets, journalists, and others who 
immortalized their experiences through writing. 
 Its association with literature has kept the Spanish Civil War a highly romanticized topic. 
Books written by foreign soldiers of the International Brigades cement the war’s place in 
historical memory as a battle of good versus evil, of freedom versus oppression. Hemingway’s 
For Whom the Bell Tolls and Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia are two famous examples that 
idolize the international solidarity which came to characterize the war. In former socialist 
countries, the war held an important status as a defense of the first leftist popular-front 
government. Its internationalism and its significance in the history of popular-front politics 
played an important role in the memory of the war. In the GDR, German volunteers were 
remembered as Spanienkämpfer (“Spain fighters”). Many of them went on to serve official roles 
in the East German government.4 Cities erected monuments to the Spanienkämpfer, and some 
were considered important enough for their faces to appear on government stamps. 
 This work examines a lesser-told side of German involvement in the Spanish Civil War. 
While the existing literature tends to focus on the German government’s role in the war, the 
intersection of the two countries’ antifascist resistance efforts raises interesting questions in its 
own right. As I discuss in the following chapter, some scholars have studied this topic in recent 
years. The following pages, however, reframe the topic. Rather than examining the role that 
German antifascists played in the Spanish Civil War, this thesis discusses the role that the war 
played on German antifascism. In doing so, it aims to build upon the literature on the German 
 
4 A prominent example among these is Walter Ulbricht, the second East German head of state. 
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left in the Spanish Civil War, which has evolved into a far more meticulous and holistic field in 
recent decades owing to the opening of former East German archives. More broadly, this work 
provides a nuanced alternative to the literature on German antifascism during the period of 
National Socialism, which often neglects the ‘bottom’ of the political hierarchy. 
 There is still work to be done on this topic. Due to time constraints in the archives, this 
thesis examines the top-down aspect only from the perspective of the KPD. Even though the 
KPD played a much more active role in the Spanish Civil War than the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), both perspectives are valuable in understanding the development of the united antifascist 
front in the context of the International Brigades. Furthermore, important stories from individuals 
are scattered throughout archives in Germany. This analysis draws from published memoirs as 
well as unpublished accounts at the Bundesarchiv, Germany’s national archives. Some additional 
sources from the Berlin State Archive are also used. However, smaller and more local archives 
throughout Germany’s sixteen federal states hold interesting and informative stories that could 
not be used in this thesis. It is also worth noting that, in many of these cases, there is little or no 
available information about the individuals providing their accounts. However, their stories are 
still important to consider when looking at the everyday experiences in the International 
Brigades. 
Finally, the stigma associated with the word ‘resistance’ in the discourse on Nazi 
Germany merits a brief discussion in the context of this thesis. In a review of Detlev Peukert’s 
Die KPD im Widerstand (The KPD in Resistance), Albert Lindemann begins with an 
informative, if biting summary of the ethical problem tied to the word:5 
 
5 Detlev Peukert, Die KPD im Widerstand: Verfolgung und Untergrundarbeit an Rhein und Ruhr 1933 bis 1945 
(Wuppertal: Hammer, 1980). 
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[The book] deals with a subject, the resistance to Nazism inside Germany, that was at 
best a feeble affair and that in some of its better-known forms, whether right or left wing, 
was not particularly inspiring or attractive, especially to non-Germans. And it failed 
overwhelmingly. Yet here is a tome of some 460 pages (and no index) admiringly 
devoted to anti-Nazi resistance in a single region of Germany and within a party whose 
most characteristic attitude of resistance was to wait until the Nazis destroyed themselves 
and, that failing, to lie low.6 
Any study of German resistance should note that, relative to the scale of inaction against the 
Nazi regime, resistance was scarce. To be sure, even where anti-Nazi sentiment existed, it did 
not necessarily preclude anti-Semitism, a toxic xenophobia that permeated nearly all spheres of 
German life. One should not distort historical reality by envisioning a well-organized, large-scale 
struggle against the regime.  
This thesis does not glorify the resistance movement within Germany as a powerful 
obstacle to Nazism. Instead, it aims to shed light on one overlooked display of antifascist 
resistance—the participation of German political émigrés in the Spanish Civil War. To use 
Lindemann’s word, anti-Nazi resistance was undoubtedly feeble within German borders. 
However, the German political exiles established a new center of German antifascism on the 
front lines of the Spanish war. The above characterization of the KPD’s resistance also reflects 
the deficiencies of a purely top-down approach to political history. It is true that, at the executive 
level, the German left allowed lingering rivalries to block their unity in opposition to Nazism. 
However, as this thesis explores, activity at the parties’ top levels did not always mirror the 
popular sentiment felt by German antifascists. On the whole, the resistance movement was not 
well executed, nor was it successful—but instances of resistance should not be ignored. 
 
 
6 Albert S. Lindemann, “Die KPD Im Widerstand (Book Review)” in American Historical Review 87, no. 1 (1982), 
p. 205. 
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II. Berlin and Madrid in Solidarity 
Understanding the German-Spanish Relationship, 1936-1939 
 
Despite its name, the Spanish Civil War reached far beyond the limits of a civil war. 
Though it took place entirely within the country’s borders, it was unprecedented in its level of 
grassroots foreign involvement. As the first country to formally descend into war between left 
and right factions, the important implications of Spain’s future were apparent to foreigners 
comprising the entire political spectrum. Franco’s rebellion enjoyed Hitler’s and Mussolini’s 
military support in an early display of international fascist solidarity, and the communist parties 
of Europe staked their ground as defenders of democracy in the face of right-wing dictatorship. It 
was in this context that the International Brigades formed and became a centerpiece of the 
resistance movement in Spain. Drawing on the support of volunteers from across the planet, the 
International Brigades turned a coup against the Spanish government into a global conflict. 
Although the literature on the International Brigades often portrays the fight in Spain as 
one between the international left and right, both the German right and the various factions of the 
left quickly recognized the importance of the events in Spain to their respective national causes.7 
The former narrative is certainly important; the Spanish Civil War was indeed a proxy war 
between the left and right, between the European fascist superpowers and the international 
communist movement. However, this narrative often overshadows the significance of the war 
 
7 See: Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe, International Communism and the Communist International, 1919-43 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, International Communism and the 
Spanish Civil War: Solidarity and Suspicion (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015); and Michael 
Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994). 
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from the perspective of specific national participants who were fighting in their own political 
interests.  
When examined through this framework, it becomes apparent that the Spanish Civil War 
played an important role in the German left’s struggle against its own government. The 
international reach of Stalin and the Communist International cannot be neglected. But Spain 
represented a more immediate opportunity than the global Bolshevik revolution that those groups 
had envisioned. The German left, like the Nazi regime, recognized the importance of the war for 
its political causes. Altogether, by looking at both the KPD leadership and those volunteering in 
Spain themselves, the German defense of the Spanish Republic stands out from the narratives 
that often dominate the discourse on the International Brigades. To illustrate the role of the 
Spanish Civil War in German antifascism, this thesis frames the story of the Spanienkämpfer 
through the unique lens of German resistance. 
 Before analyzing the relationship between the German resistance and the Spanish Civil 
War, this chapter provides a brief overview of the war and its domestic importance to German 
antifascists. It then includes a short historiographical review that aims to situate this study among 
broader scholarship, both on the German International Brigades specifically and on German 
antifascist resistance. 
 
Germany and the Spanish Civil War 
 
Hitler’s Gamble in Spain 
Hitler’s interest in Spain was complicated. He had already established friendly relations 
with other fascist leaders, most notably Mussolini, but he had not even known of Emilio Mola, 
9 
 
Francisco Franco, or Spain’s Falangist fringe prior to July 1936.8 While Italy seemed like a 
logical political ally, there was almost nothing inherently obvious about the relationship between 
Spain and Germany. Hitler was largely unfamiliar with Spanish politics, loathed the Catholic 
Church,9 and did not regard early 20th century Spain as a major European power.10 After the 
election of the left-wing Frente Popular to Spain’s parliament in February 1936, the Spanish left 
had a far higher international profile than the right. The European communists were more 
focused on Spain than their fascist counterparts for precisely this reason. 
 It is possible that this wave of antifascist excitement itself motivated Hitler to intervene in 
Spain. Because the Comintern and other international leftist circles celebrated the Spanish 
election, some historians have argued that Hitler’s interest in Spain was reactionary and deeply 
rooted in symbolic victory over world communism.11 Otherwise, Hitler’s particular motive in the 
country is difficult to justify given the risk of prematurely provoking instability and allotting 
substantial resources to a foreign cause. This was especially true considering his domestic and 
international vulnerabilities. 
Hitler’s motivations likely also had more tangible ambitions. Firstly, with plans to invade 
France, he envisioned the strategic edge of wedging the French between his own army and that 
of a sympathetic (or indebted) collaborator. Hitler did not expect a fascist Spain to wage an all-
out war against France. But even if it simply turned a blind eye to a German invasion, he would 
still be at an advantage. A calculated military intervention in Spain would come with another 
 
8 Stanley G. Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008), p. 23. 
9 Hitler similarly overlooked his abhorrence of Catholicism in his strategic alliance with Mussolini, whose fascist 
government placed great value on the Church. 
10 Payne, 22. 
11 On Nazi Germany’s motivations in the Spanish Civil War, see Robert H. Whealy, Hitler and Spain: The Nazi 
Role in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1989); and Manfred 
Merkes “Die deutsche Politik gegenüber dem Spanischen Bürgerkrieg, 1936-1939” (Dissertation, L. Röhrscheid, 
1961). 
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wartime benefit: the chance to prepare for a full-scale war, far from Germany and likely with 
minimal consequences. 
 Hitler did not predict the war to rage on for three years, but he found a sinister tactical 
advantage in dragging it out: distraction. Despite Germany’s military support, Hitler consistently 
refused to openly engage politically with the Spanish Nationalists. Instead, he deliberately left 
official state engagement to Mussolini, who gave political counsel and demonstrated heightened 
commitment to the Nationalists. Memos seized from the German Navy High Command outline 
Hitler’s prolonged distraction policy in Spain, making clear the Nazis’ desire to “occupy 
Europe’s attention and therefore divert it from Germany.”12 Hitler was careful not to overplay his 
involvement in Spain. Instead, he preferred to quietly reap the economic benefits of his 
arrangement.13  The German policy, unlike Italy’s, was self-interested and distant. In one 
instance, German officials even attempted a secretive diplomatic ploy to prevent Franco from 
easily capturing Catalonia, one of the Republican army’s last major strongholds. A communist 
Catalonia would have allied with France against a fascist Spain. Such a move would pit France 
against Spain, and would therefore incentivize Spain to support a German invasion of its 
northern neighbor.14 Hitler thus attempted to sabotage his ally in order to manipulate the 
geopolitical landscape. Unlike Mussolini’s Italy, which aimed to position Spain into its sphere of 
influence, Nazi Germany opted to sustain the civil war as a decoy, diverting international 
attention away from its most damning endeavors—rearmament, annexation, and invasion. 
 
 
 
12 Whealey, 54. 
13 See Christian Leitz, Economic Relations between Nazi Germany and Franco's Spain, 1936-1945 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996). 
14 Whealey, 60. 
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German Antifascists Respond 
German antifascists were aware not only of Hitler’s nominal support of the Nationalist 
rebellion, but also of his military support and his larger intent. Seeing the implications for their 
own homeland, writers for the German antifascist press emphasized the role that Spanienkämpfer 
played in the German resistance movement. The official newspaper of the XI Brigade, 
Pasaremos, frequently published material connecting the struggles in Germany and Spain. 
Though the International Brigades are often considered in the context of global communism, 
Pasaremos emphasized fighting the Nazi regime as more important than the global communist 
ideal. In many instances, it presented the civil war as a continuation of the resistance work that 
communists had undertaken in the Reich. It consistently stressed that victory in Spain was 
imperative to antifascist success in Germany, and that Nationalist forces were, in fact, agents of 
Hitler. As one article explained: 
Hitler and Mussolini, the promotors of the war, are in need of military success due to the 
situation they created. That is why they needed to put the Italian divisions into action in 
Spain while talks continued in London. So began the open imperialist war of Hitler and 
Mussolini, the war of regular fascist armies against the Spanish people, against their 
liberty and independence. But our front has also broadened. Today, we fight not only 
before the gates of Madrid, our guns, our cannons are now aimed at the centers of 
fascism, at Rome and Berlin.15 
 
The article is typical of reporting directed toward the Spanienkämpfer. Its message centers on the 
relevance of Spain to the domestic resistance against Hitler, and it attributes the war to his and 
Mussolini’s aggressive military policies. Articles like this one affirmed the practicality of 
fighting in Spain and augmented morale. The methods of internal resistance were completely 
underground, largely unorganized, and generally unimpactful. To German antifascists, the 
 
15 SAPMO-BArch, SgY 11/ V 237/ 11/ 152, “Pasaremos 5.” 
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International Brigades were inherently tied to the future of their own home. Their service in the 
Brigades offered a greater promise of success than resistance efforts within the Reich’s borders. 
 Fritz Rettmann, a volunteer who later moved to the GDR, expressed in his recollections 
of the war that he felt he was fighting for Germany. “If fascism were defeated in Spain, that 
would also weaken German fascism and mean better conditions for the antifascist struggle in 
Germany.”16 Rettmann also indicated that he and his peers followed the war’s unfolding closely, 
using it as a lesson for Germany’s resistance movement. “It was all passionately discussed by us 
every day…we eagerly read everything published about [the war]. We were especially interested 
in the implementation of the idea of the popular front in Spanish practical life. The Spanish 
example of a popular front was indeed a lesson for us.”17 Rettmann’s characterization of the civil 
war as a matter of domestic importance demonstrates how volunteers saw their presence as a 
continuation of domestic resistance methods. They wanted to directly transfer the things they 
experienced in Spain back to Germany. 
The domestic importance of the Spanish Civil War to the broader anti-Nazi community is 
perhaps best evidenced by the German International Brigades’ bipartisan nature. Although most 
were affiliated with the KPD, there was a strong effort to form a coalition with the SPD, as the 
fourth chapter will expand upon. Scholars have put forth differing estimates on the political 
makeup of German volunteers in the International Brigades, but estimates for the percentage of 
social democrats in the Brigades ranges from four to fifteen percent.18 One known sample, 
 
16 C Rep. 902-02-02 (Nr. 92), “Schriftenreihe zur FDJ (20) (1979),“ p. 15. 
17 Ibid, 15-16. 
18 The number of German soldiers in the International Brigades is estimated at roughly 2,300. Mallmann estimates 
that about 300 were social democrats, while zur Mühlen places the number at 100. 
Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Wilfried Loth, Kommunisten in Der Weimarer Republik: Sozialgeschichte Einer 
Revolutionären Bewegung (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996). 
Patrik von zur Mühlen, Spanien war ihre Hoffnung: die deutsche Linke im Spanischen Bürgerkrieg, 1936 bis 1939 
(Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1983). 
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conducted by Klaus-Michael Mallmann, found that about fourteen percent of volunteers from the 
German Saarland territory were social democrats, but this number could be misleading given that 
the Saarland was a rare example of effective KPD and SPD cooperation.19 For German 
antifascists, fighting in Spain was directly linked to the German resistance movement as it meant 
fighting Hitler as directly as possible. 
 
German Antifascist Resistance: Problems and Progress in Historiography 
 
The Historiographical Evolution of the German International Brigades 
 Above are two narratives of the German presence in the Spanish Civil War: one of the 
Nazi regime’s involvement and one of the left’s subsequent intervention. Though both sides of 
the Spanish-German relationship are tied to one another, one receives greater attention—both in 
historical memory and in scholarship. Most literature on German involvement in Spain is told 
from the top-down. As such, the perspectives of the Nazi regime and its Spanish ally play a 
larger role in historiography than those of the exiled parties and volunteer soldiers. By telling the 
story of the German left’s involvement in the Spanish Civil War, this thesis aims to provide an 
alternative narrative. To do so, it bridges two related fields of scholarship. It draws from the 
extensive literature on prewar German communism and builds upon the research that historians 
have conducted on the German International Brigades. 
In the vast scholarship on the internationalism of the Spanish Civil War, a relatively 
small portion centers specifically on the role that Germans played, despite the fact that German 
 
19 Mallmann, Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik; Josie McLellan, Antifascism and Memory in East Germany: 
Remembering the International Brigades, 1945-1989 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), p. 18. 
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volunteers likely made up about eight percent of the International Brigades.20 In much of this 
literature, the relationship between Hitler and Franco tends to shadow the experience of the 
German left and its resistance against those two forces. However, this juxtaposition is what 
makes Germany’s case during the Spanish Civil War so unique. While the governing Nazi 
regime was the predominant sponsor of Franco’s rebellion, Germans also comprised the second-
largest group in the International Brigades, behind only the French volunteers.21 
For decades after the war’s end, those curious about Germans in the International 
Brigades could find little in the way of academic research. After Germany’s division into the 
Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic, scholars had limited access to East German 
archives, where almost all of the material on the KPD and the Spanish Civil War was housed. 
Additionally, the bulk of the literature on the Spanienkämpfer was written by Spanienkämpfer 
themselves. These memoirs, mostly published in East Germany, became a kind of genre of their 
own. Autobiographies reflecting on the Spanish Civil War, like that of Gustav Szinda, Willi 
Bredel, and other influential GDR politicians, played an important role in the memory of the 
Spanish Civil War.22 Many authors from around the world took part in the International 
Brigades, including Ernest Hemingway, George Orwell, and Pablo Neruda.23 Because of the 
considerable presence of writers, memoirs and novels recalling the culture of international 
solidarity and belief in democracy helped to cement the war’s romanticized place in memory as 
an international battle of good versus evil. The culture of the International Brigades also reached 
 
20 Josie McLellan, “'I Wanted to Be a Little Lenin': Ideology and the German International Brigade Volunteers,” in 
the Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 2 (2006): pp. 287-288. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Gustav Szinda, Die XI. Brigade (Berlin: Verlag des Ministeriums für Nationale Verteidigung, 1956); Willi Bredel, 
Spanienkrieg: Zur Geschichte Der 11. Internationale Brigade (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1986). 
On the role of authors in the German International Brigades, see Wilfried F. Schoeller, Die Kinder Von Guernica: 
Deutsche Schriftsteller Zum Spanischen Bürgerkrieg: Reportagen, Erinnerungen, Kommentare (Berlin: Aufbau 
Taschenbuch-Verlag, 2004). 
23 Zur Mühlen, 138. 
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beyond the literary realm. The songs of the Spanish Civil War continued to hold an esteemed 
place, particularly in the communist countries, as homages to the war. Some of them were 
written by well-known German writers like Bertolt Brecht and Paul Dessau and later became 
well-known antifascist anthems. Though scholarship on German antifascists in Spain may have 
been sparse, the memory of resistance remained alive through the stories told and sung by 
surviving Spanienkämpfer long after their return home.24 
In the eight decades since the Spanish Civil War’s end, German authors have sought to 
refine the historical literature on the subject. Until the consolidation of German archives after the 
fall of the GDR, significant research was hampered. But owing to increased accessibility to 
Spanish archives in the early 1980s, West German historian Patrik von zur Mühlen was able to 
publish the most comprehensive study on the Spanish Civil War from a German antifascist 
perspective to date. Spanien war ihre Hoffnung (Spain was their Hope), published in 1983, 
tackled the subject from a largely thematic angle, giving political and cultural context to shed 
light on the German experience. Zur Mühlen’s book combined data-driven demographic study, 
autobiographical literature, and research from Spanish archives to provide a thorough 
investigation of the Spanienkämpfer. 
Since then, the only lengthy analysis of the topic has been Ralf Niemeyer’s 2001 masters’ 
dissertation from the University of Hamburg, Die KPD und der Spanische Bürgerkrieg 1936-
1939 (“The KPD and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939”).25 Whereas zur Mühlen’s book covers 
the broader German left in the Spanish Civil War—communists, social democrats, and 
anarchists—Niemeyer’s dissertation narrows its analysis to the KPD. And, while the former at 
times reads like a work of social and cultural history (and at times like military history), the latter 
 
24 Ernst Busch, Lieder Der Internationalen Brigaden (Kiel: Rotfront-Verlag, 1975). 
25 Ralf Niemeyer, “Die KPD und der Spanische Bürgerkrieg 1936-1939“ (Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag, 2001). 
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falls unquestionably in the realm of political history. After establishing the context of the KPD 
during the 1930s, Niemeyer highlights the party organization’s influence on political 
relationships, media, and propaganda throughout the war. Both books, however, reflect a better 
understanding of the importance of the Spanish war to domestic German resistance politics. 
These two authors have laid the groundwork for more nuanced, concentrated studies on 
the German International Brigades, which, since 1989, has allowed for a wider range of 
perspectives. Using a similar methodology as zur Mühlen, Arno Lustiger’s 1989 Schalom 
Libertad! looks at the presence of Jews fighting in the International Brigades, many of whom 
came from Germany and Austria. Reflecting the social and cultural emphasis characteristic of 
Spanien war ihre Hoffnung, Anna Goppel’s 2003 article analyzes the experience and motivations 
of German women who volunteered in Spain.26 Conversely, Alejandro Andreassi Cieri’s 2014 
article in Hispania draws from Niemeyer’s politically-focused work as it analyzes the Spanish 
Civil War’s role on the exiled KPD and prospect of an antifascist popular front.27 Altogether, the 
use of both top-down and bottom-up approaches to this subject has broadened the scope of the 
literature, making it more thorough and allowing for a wider range of nuanced perspectives. This 
thesis employs a similar methodology and draws from these works to balance the narrative 
between party and individual perspectives. 
 
A Historiographical Review of Prewar German Communism 
This thesis draws extensively from the scholarship of pre-WWII German communism 
and lends itself to a brief literature discussion. It is impossible to make a single, broad 
 
26 Anna Goppel, “Fighting Fascism: German and Austrian Women in the Spanish Civil War 1936-39,” in the 
International Journal of Iberian Studies 16, no. 1 (2003): 1–76. 
27 Alejandro Andreassi Cieri, "El KPD en la Guerra Civil Española y la Cuestión del Frente Popular: Algunas 
Reflexiones" in Hispania - Revista Española De Historia 74 (246) (2014): 177-204. 
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characterization of the scholarship on German communism. Some of the divisions in this field 
result from the differing perspectives between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ historians before 1989, 
when fundamental differences in methodology and perspective influenced the findings of 
scholars. The often-conflicting impressions of top-down and bottom-up histories further divide 
the literature. Norman LaPorte explains that “during the 1970s, a wave of ‘histories from below’ 
placed the dynamic of the KPD’s policy-making decisions firmly within the German context...”28 
Since then, the narrative of German communism has been changing to accommodate the 
divergent perspectives that resulted from the Cold War period and differing methodologies. 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of archives in the former East, historians 
have conducted a flurry of research on German communism in the 20th century. The emphasis on 
East Germany in scholarship on German communism is understandable. To many watching from 
the other side of the “Iron Curtain”, and perhaps even more so after its collapse, the GDR was 
shrouded in a post-apocalyptic air and known for surveillance, brutality, and deprivation. As 
such, the legacy of German communism is easily associated with such themes, both in popular 
culture and in scholarship. However, this perception of the country’s relationship with the radical 
left neglects an important tradition of German communism, one deeply rooted in the 
revolutionary thinking of the Weimar Republic and tied inextricably to the insidious rise of 
Nazism. 
Two lengthy studies on the subject emerged in the years following the end of the GDR: 
E.D. Weitz’s Creating German Communism, 1890-1990: From Popular Protest to Socialist 
State and Mallmann’s Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik: Sozialgeschichte einer 
 
28 Norman H LaPorte, “'Stalinization' and its Limits in the Saxon KPD, 1925-28” in European History Quarterly 31, 
no. 4 (2001): 549–90, p. 550. 
18 
 
Revolutionärer Bewegung.29 Weitz’s book straddles the line between provocative ‘bottom-up 
historians’ and traditional top-down analyses. However, Mallmann’s work is more characteristic 
of the former. His bottom-up analysis of the KPD appears throughout this thesis to introduce a 
nuanced narrative of the German resistance in the Spanish Civil War, and his concept of a “niche 
community” receives lengthy attention in the following chapter. 
Mallmann’s analysis of the KPD’s reliance on the Comintern takes a domestic, on-the-
ground approach. His research is based on local experiences of German communists and rejects 
the Western model of communist history in which the Soviet communist party apparatus in 
Moscow controlled all communist parties. Mallmann stresses that the literature on the 
communist party is skewed toward top-down studies, and that it is equally important to consider 
the hundreds of thousands of KPD members who experienced the party as it affected their lives. 
He argues that there was a rift between what the party leadership and the party’s members 
experienced. To support this claim, he examined memoirs and data, mostly from the Saarland, 
about the changes that occurred within the KPD. This thesis builds upon Mallmann’s work, 
arguing that what transpired at the executive level was not always representative of the bottom-
up experience of the German left. 
 Based on both Weitz’s and Mallmann’s work, it is clear that attitudes on the subject of 
prewar German communism have shifted due to Western and Soviet-influenced studies merging 
as archives consolidated. Still, the question of methodology remains relevant and has 
implications on the KPD’s activities abroad. Mallmann’s reading of KPD history is particularly 
 
29 Eric D Weitz, Creating German Communism, 1890-1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State (Princeton, 
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relevant to this study, as it uses sources and perspectives from below to challenge what a top-
down analysis would suggest. 
 The literature on this topic uses different methodologies and perspectives to analyze 
German resistance. While some historians choose to approach the subject of the German 
International Brigades from a political point of view, other texts read more like a social or 
cultural history. Moreover, there are important divisions within the literature on German 
communism and anti-Nazi resistance that reflect the differences between top-down and bottom-
up narratives. The following chapters endeavor to incorporate both the ‘top’ and the ‘bottom’ to 
provide a holistic understanding of the Spanienkämpfer as an integral part of German resistance. 
To do so, I draw from sources at the KPD’s executive level and accounts from German 
volunteers. As the next chapter demonstrates, these sources are useful in understanding the 
effects that the antifascist community in Spain had on identity-formation and party revitalization 
among the German left. 
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III. Transplants in the Transnational War 
The Birth of a Niche Community in the International Brigades 
 
The situation in 1936 seemed dire for German antifascists. Hitler’s steady centralization 
of power and continued roundup of suspected political enemies led to doubt as to whether a 
united front against the Nazis could arise. The KPD leadership, now based in Paris, had 
relatively little contact with the Prague-based SPD, and the 1935 attempt at establishing a 
popular front in Paris was unsuccessful. The Spanish Civil War provided a space for the various 
factions of the German left to group together and organize more thoroughly than they could 
previously. The milieu that arose in Spain influenced the identity formation of the German left at 
a time when it lacked community elsewhere in Europe. 
This chapter refocuses the analysis of the war’s influence on the German left. It 
contributes to a gap in existing English-language literature, which centrally analyzes the German 
left’s involvement solely from international viewpoints—whether through the lens of the 
Comintern or the International Brigades. In order to understand the Spanish Civil War in the 
German context it is important to consider the perspectives of both the KPD leadership and its 
party members. From the perspective of party leaders, the Spanish war was a chance to 
systematically provide military, political, and organizational training to its base. They believed 
that this experience could bring up a generation of antifascist fighters to ride the wave of 
successful resistance into Germany. Whereas the war presented a logistical opportunity for the 
party organization, the individuals experienced a new, collective identity associated with the 
Spanish Civil War. Among mostly strangers, they found belonging and kinship thousands of 
miles from home. 
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The milieu that arose in Spain was unique for the KPD. It gave the party a new arena in 
which to exchange ideas, openly educate new recruits, and increase its rate of political training. 
All of these created an environment in which communists could not only gain experience 
fighting, they could also look to the front lines of the Spanish Civil War as a center of German 
communism. After the exiled KPD put out a call for all able-bodied antifascists to turn their 
attention to Spain in solidarity with the Spanish Frente Popular, communists hurried to join the 
crusade and reconvene with other political outlaws.30 With substantial numbers of communists 
gathering in one place, the KPD was able to provide political, military, and officer training to the 
almost entirely working-class cohort. 
This chapter analyzes the milieu—in other words, the social and cultural environment—
of working-class Germans that developed in Spain between 1936 and 1939. First, it summarizes 
Klaus-Michael Mallmann’s study of left-proletarian milieus and their significance to identity 
formation among German workers. It then discusses the significance of the milieu in Spain, both 
for the party organization and for the volunteers themselves. Altogether, I aim to provide a 
holistic analysis of the German left in the Spanish Civil War. By bringing together the 
experiences of party officials and soldiers, this chapter sheds light on the community of German 
antifascists that arose in Spain. It argues that, during these years, the transplant community in 
Spain became the center of German antifascism and had important implications for both the 
party leadership and the broader movement. 
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The Antifascist Community in Spain: An Experiment in Pluralism 
 
Though it became the center of antifascist resistance after 1936, Spain was not a popular 
country for German antifascist émigrés until its civil war began. For one thing, unlike France, the 
United Kingdom, or the Netherlands, it lacked an international cultural hub. Furthermore, Spain 
was not a country where German was widely spoken or understood, as it had relatively little 
historical connection and there was no large German presence there.31 To compound this, about 
half of the country’s population was illiterate, severely limiting its potential as a place of 
intellectual exchange for exiled leftists.32 On top of these challenges, the country’s economic 
conditions were horrendous. Still, the milieu that developed in Spain was in many ways a 
product of the roots that German settlers in Spain had planted. From the 1920s on, some German 
artists, writers, and intellectuals settled near the coasts and lived in small creative colonies, often 
on the islands of Mallorca and Ibiza.33 Some high-profile Germans had thus established 
themselves in Spain before 1936, but these anecdotal instances did not amount to a large, 
influential community prior to the war. 
The exception to the insignificant German community in Spain was Barcelona. The 
Catalonian capital was home to the country’s largest population of German émigrés and what 
most resembled a community. This was partly due to the fact that Barcelona was a center of 
European anarcho-syndicalism. It also was the most cosmopolitan and international of Spain’s 
large cities. There were, however, several German leftists who had come to Barcelona prior to 
the civil war for another reason. In the summer of 1936, Spain was set to host the People’s 
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Olympiad, a sports tournament intended for antifascists to symbolically protest the 1936 
Olympics held in Nazi Germany. The games were to take place in Barcelona, which had lost to 
Berlin in its bid to host the official Olympic games. After Barcelona failed to secure the bid, the 
Frente Popular government refused to take part in Berlin’s Olympic Games, instead organizing 
its own event in the hopes that other countries would drop out. The People’s Olympiad 
ultimately made a splash on the international stage, registering 6,000 athletes from 17 sovereign 
nations.34 In addition to these countries, teams representing unrecognized nationalities and 
colonies attended.35 Countries that had elected fascist dictatorships—like Germany and Italy—
were represented by political exiles. Though its organizers cancelled the games just one day 
short of beginning due to the outbreak of the civil war (and heavy street fighting), thousands of 
athletes had already arrived in Barcelona, including the German team. Some of those German 
athletes, who had come to Spain in protest against their own government, stayed to become some 
of the first international defenders of the Spanish Republic even before the founding of the 
International Brigades.36 
 From the very first incarnation of the German International Brigades, the Spanish 
community of German antifascists was characterized by its partisan unity. By the end of the 
month, the KPD had sent Hans Beimler to serve as the party’s representative in Spain, who 
essentially led a small cohort of Germans who had voluntarily come to join the war effort. He 
and a small group of KPD functionaries met in early August in Barcelona, where they formed the 
“Centuria Thälmann,” a militia of mostly German volunteers that spanned the broad spectrum of 
antifascism. The Centuria Thälmann grew consistently. Karl Hoetzel, one of its first members, 
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recounted that by the third week of August, the amount of soldiers numbered 82.37 By October, 
the group recorded 110 soldiers on a list of combatants.38 Because it built upon the limited 
community of antifascists that had existed in Barcelona prior to the war, the militia was 
composed not only of communists and social democrats; it also included a large proportion of 
anarchists. As the International Brigades grew, solidarity continued to hold together these 
antifascists. 
  
From Above: The KPD Shapes the Niche Community in Spain 
 
The milieu in Spain provided an opportunity for the exiled KPD party organization—one 
that it welcomed after three years of political exile. Victory over the Spanish Nationalists was an 
attractive symbolic goal for the KPD party organization, as it was for all other communist 
parties. However, the party made efforts to shape the nature of the expat community by 
establishing its own institutions. Though the International Brigades evoke the image of 
transnationalism, the KPD party organization was interested in maintaining its important status 
within the German milieu and the larger German resistance movement. 
The lack of KPD leadership posed great challenges to the fragmented party and had a 
profound effect on the new generation of German communists. In his article “La KPD y la 
Guerra Civil Española,” Alejandro Andreassi Cieri argues that the KPD’s precarious situation as 
an exiled party drove its leading executives to intervene so strongly in Spain.39 In contrast to the 
party members of a few years prior, the new German communists were ill-trained politically and 
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had little bureaucracy to adhere to. According to Ralf Niemeyer, “contrary to the consistently 
maintained claims of GDR historians that the KPD had never been without leadership, the actual 
lack of authorities in communist groups was documented by those in the ‘high places.’”40 In 
effect, Spain would serve as a fresh start for the KPD to provide proper training to its 
functionaries: politically, bureaucratically, and militarily. 
The chance to advance its training operations was one of the advantages the KPD saw in 
shaping the milieu in Spain. With its large presence of communist and socialist volunteers, the 
Spanish war gave the party a place to set up its own means of political, military, and ideological 
training without sending functionaries to the Soviet Union. Most of the KPD’s training took 
place in the few Parteischule (party schools) that the party had established in Spain. The first 
party school opened in Benicàssim, a small village south of Valencia and nestled between the 
Desert de les Palmes mountains to the West and the Mediterranean Sea to the East. 
The school demonstrated the level of party involvement that the KPD established on the 
war front in Spain and its role in crafting the wartime experience of German volunteers. Its roster 
list shows that it served not only German communists, but also social democrats, suggesting it 
more broadly served the community of Spanienkämpfer. Specifically, the school carried four 
objectives, and all of these were indicative of the KPD’s structure and political ambitions. Its 
first function was to address the importance of the political delegates, commissars, and the 
character of the war, which allowed the party to frame the war from a communist perspective for 
its students. The second was to introduce the politics of the Frente Popular government, the 
tactics of winning the war, the goals of the fascist intervention, and the political operations in the 
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enemy camp. This served as political training. The tactics of war were something that communist 
émigrés were often sent to Moscow to study. Moreover, the achievement of a German Volksfront 
was one of the KPD’s most pressing tasks. Third, the school aimed to provide a basic 
understanding of Spain’s political and economic structure, as well as the origins and history of 
the Popular Front. The final objective was to bring an understanding of the recruits’ home 
country into the context of the war in Spain, ensuring that the soldiers understood the domestic 
value of the war. The Parteischule was one of the primary ways in which the KPD shaped the 
character of the milieu from above.41 
 Despite Benicàssim’s isolated location, the KPD’s political commissar in Spain closely 
administered the school to ensure it was under party control. Every 14 days, the school’s 
fulfillment of the above objectives was to be reviewed, along with more detailed aspects of the 
coursework. Namely, the political commissar would provide the school with a list of acceptable 
topics and push the course in the political direction of his choosing. This “political schoolwork” 
included (but was not limited to) an analysis of current events and developments occurring 
within the last review period.42 To ensure efficiency, the school’s administration had to 
guarantee that 9 students each week were ready for political schoolwork. Finally, the participants 
were reviewed through a “political exam” that measured the pupils’ readiness to join the front. 
To earn a satisfactory grade, students needed to achieve a solid understanding of the Spanish 
Popular Front and the responsibilities and methods of political work in the International 
Brigades.43 Using these methods of control, the KPD used the Spanish war as a chance to 
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introduce a vigorous political training program and bring up another generation of party 
functionaries. 
By shaping the community of German antifascists from above, the KPD was able to use 
the milieu in Spain to its advantage. It could provide military and political training to its base 
while also providing ideological education to volunteers in exile. Using the practical example of 
the Spanish Civil War, it brought its primary focus on popular front politics into the foreground 
of its educational efforts. The establishment of the niche community in Spain gave the KPD a 
chance to revitalize its base and play an active role in training antifascist resistance fighters. 
In addition to the propaganda being distributed at the party school, the KPD ran an 
intense propaganda campaign to control the atmosphere in the communist camp. From its base in 
Paris, the senior leadership saw to the dissemination of brochures, flyers, and newspapers, 
delivering both war-related propaganda to Germany and KPD materials to representatives in 
Spain.44 Additionally, the party reached German communists in Spain through the XI. Brigade-
published newspaper Pasaremos. The KPD ran much of its propaganda machine from a special 
office in Spain known as the Deutsches Büro (“German office”), which often compiled excerpts 
from the Spanish-language press and distributed them to the KPD base in Spain.45 This way, the 
KPD could control and censor the information it distributed. 
The result was that the KPD was able to control the narrative that German antifascists 
consumed. The press and propaganda that KPD functionaries closely administered constituted an 
important piece of the party’s political work. Not all of the KPD’s propaganda came directly 
from the Central Committee. Materials produced in Spain made their way to a party press office 
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located in Paris, where KPD officers tweaked and edited publications before releasing them for 
distribution in Germany.46 Because antifascist publications were outlawed in 1933, these KPD-
influenced organs were some of the only news outlets that German antifascists had access to. The 
KPD’s influential press and propaganda output gave it an important advantage in framing the 
war to German antifascists outside of Spain. 
One of the most important functions of the press, from the KPD’s perspective, was to 
connect the Spanish Civil War’s emphasis on the popular front to the aspiration of unity in 
Germany.47 The theme of Volksfrontpolitik (“popular front politics”) appeared often in the 
various newspapers of the German International Brigades. The headlines of Pasaremos 
frequently reflected the objective of practical solidarity. In the March 8, 1938 issue of 
Pasaremos, two large headlines read “Einig für Spanien, Einig für Deutschland!” (“United for 
Spain, United for Germany!”) and “Unser Bataillon marschiert im Geiste der Februarkämpfe” 
(“Our Battalion marches in the spirit of [Austria’s freedom]”).48 As the next chapter examines, 
March 1938 was a critical time in which the niche community in Spain pushed for a united 
antifascist front against Hitler. As the question of the popular front was the most salient issue of 
the German left, the KPD attempted to frame the civil war from that perspective in its reports to 
Germans abroad. 
As discussed at greater length in the next chapter, the KPD had resolved at the Brüsseler 
Konferenz (“Brussels Conference”) in 1935 that achieving a united antifascist front with the SPD 
was its most urgent task. As such, its press organs in Spain took on the task of motivating and 
informing antifascists in exile by giving them an inside look at the dynamics of the Spanish 
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Popular Front and the International Brigades. Regarding the influence that the KPD press 
network had, Niemeyer explains: 
The communists played a decisive role in the drafting and editing of the newspapers, and 
the press of the International Brigades was subject to censorship. One could therefore 
argue that there was a press and propaganda monopoly in the International Brigades, 
especially given the scarcity of other contact between the soldiers and the outside 
world.49 
 
However, as Niemeyer notes, the political task of showcasing the popular front’s importance was 
not solely directed toward antifascists outside of Spain. Some of the communist Spanienkämpfer 
who came to the Spanish Republic’s aid did not do so as proponents of the popular front, but 
rather to fight for the “Soviet Republic” of Spain.50 
 Through its control of education and propaganda, the KPD established itself as an 
important presence in the German niche community that arose in Spain. After the crisis that party 
leadership faced during the years of exile, the International Brigades presented an opportunity for 
the party to practically engage with its base, both within Spain and abroad. 
 
From Below: The Wider Antifascist Presence 
 
The Niche Community in Spain 
Klaus-Michael Mallmann has contributed greatly to our understanding of the KPD in a 
domestic context by retelling the party’s history from the bottom up. His study of the various 
milieus in which ordinary working-class Germans interacted shed light on the ways that space 
and environment contributed to the development of communist ideology. Mallmann’s research 
focused on the era of the Weimar Republic, between the end of the Great War and the election of 
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the Nazis in 1933. When applied to the German presence in the International Brigades, however, 
Mallmann’s research aptly characterizes the Spanish Civil War’s role in identity-formation and 
cultural exchange. This highlights another aspect in which the war shaped the antifascist 
struggle. It is through the lens of this milieu that this section examines the Spanienkämpfer. 
In Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik, Mallmann delved into the social 
environments associated with the German working class. Mallmann studied these environments 
as “left-proletarian milieus” in which working-class communities lived. These milieus could 
comprise easily-defined environments—family units, workplaces, or neighborhoods—but also 
more abstract circles where some of those environments intersected. Some examples include 
unions or even religious organizations. Far from the party elites, which were centered primarily 
in Berlin and Moscow, these “niche communities” of idea exchange and social interaction were 
Mallmann’s focus in studying the development of German communism from below. 
The Growth of the Niche Community 
Based on Mallmann’s concept, the International Brigades served as a left-proletarian 
milieu that impacted German resistance from below as well as above. While the KPD party 
organization focused on regaining power and influence, volunteers from below sought to regain 
morale by revitalizing the antifascist movement. The men and women volunteering their lives 
had become soldiers upon their arrival in Albacete, but until then had been low-wage workers, 
writers, and journalists, as well as serving other civilian roles. The German antifascist 
community in Spain became a milieu in which these workers-turned-soldiers, as intellectuals, 
could interact with one another. The setting of the milieu also played an important role. Rather 
than taking place in a society where antifascist sentiment was punishable by imprisonment and 
execution, the milieu existed under a system curated by the Comintern, the Spanish Republic, 
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and the thousands of leftist volunteers who had taken part in organizing it. Ultimately, Germans 
in the International Brigades encompassed a unique milieu in which they could engage with their 
exiled party in the new epicenter of global antifascist resistance. 
The intersection of these factors demonstrates the importance of the niche community. 
The relatively small population of émigrés in Spain allowed for cultural exchange and interaction 
since even before the war. Germans who took part in organizations in Barcelona worked to 
improve the leftist cultural scene in Spain, hoping to bring art and theater to Berlin’s level.51 
However, the Spanish Civil War changed the nature of the German transplant community. Most 
engaged in supporting the Republican government against the Nationalists, seeing the 
intersection between their anti-Hitler resistance and Spain’s Frente Popular. Doctors, journalists, 
engineers, and actors volunteered in combat, but also in cultural campaigns. 
These cultural activities took many forms, but they all centered on the milieu. One such 
event, as detailed in an April 1937 article in Pasaremos, was a birthday celebration for the 
mostly German Thälmann Battalion’s namesake: the imprisoned KPD leader Ernst Thälmann. 
The Battalion invited the children from a nearby village for coffee and biscuits to explain their 
cause in Spain and their efforts toward Thälmann’s eventual freedom.52 In an example that took 
place away from the front, the German antifascist club of Barcelona became something of a 
community center for the International Brigadiers. It established a concert hall, library, and 
classroom where German antifascists could gather for community engagement.53 This included 
cultural events, such as theater and musical shows, but also ways of engaging within the 
antifascist milieu. Spanish allies came for conversation groups to help Germans learn their 
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language, and injured soldiers came for support and company.54 Some German antifascists in 
Barcelona and Madrid, in conjunction with KPD functionaries, set up a radio station in early 
1937. The purpose of the station was to communicate news on the war effort, as well as 
interesting events and conversations taking place within the Brigades. The Deutscher 
Freiheitssender 29,8 (“German Freedom Station 29.8”) communicated extensively with German 
antifascists abroad. It increased the cultural value of the niche community in Spain by playing 
lectures from antifascist writers, delivering courses on topics in social history, and allowing 
émigrés to voice themselves using media outlets largely unavailable in exile.55 
All three of these examples demonstrate a level of revitalization among German 
antifascists. The presence of antifascists had been largely scattered prior to the Spanish Civil 
War, with anti-Nazi émigrés and exiles scattered in small groupings throughout Europe. In some 
ways, one can view the niche community in Spain as a continuation of the German exile 
population in Paris. Its political diversity and emphasis on popular front formation are 
reminiscent of the years between 1933 and 1935 in Paris, when dedicated antifascists fled the 
Reich to pursue their resistance in exile. After the summer of 1936, however, Paris was no longer 
the center of global antifascism. John Cornford, a British poet who later fell on the front lines of 
the Battle of Lopera, recalled his impressions upon entering Barcelona in 1936: 
In Barcelona one can understand physically what the dictatorship of the proletariat 
means. All the fascist press has been taken over. The real rule is in the hands of the 
militias. There is a real terror against the fascists. But that doesn’t alter the fact that the 
place is free—and conscious all the time of its freedom.56 
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Foreigners marveled at how palpable antifascist sentiment was in Spain. For Germans, the 
rejuvenated community within the International Brigades was important in gaining morale. 
 
Transplants Within the Transnational Community 
 
 As the Spanish Civil War was rooted in worldwide solidarity, existing literature often 
(and rightly) characterizes the International Brigades as a transnational community—one that 
blurred the boundaries between nationalities in pursuit of a common goal.57 What the literature 
focuses less on, however, are the dynamics of the transplant community that arose in Spain 
during the war. This community was the result of a combination of top-down and bottom-up 
efforts. Seeing the war’s importance to their cause, individuals on the bottom formed a circle of 
exiles in Spain that could play an active role in the German resistance. By establishing various 
institutions, the KPD party organization was active in shaping this clique from the top. 
 It is important to consider the German niche community in Spain to understand the war’s 
impact on German antifascism. Of course, the International Brigades as a whole served as a 
transnational community—that is, their common space, characteristics, and goals transcended 
nationality. However, the left-proletarian milieu that existed within the Brigades was unique in 
the exile period. There was no other place where antifascists could meaningfully assemble while 
also fighting on the front lines against Hitler and his allies. 
Overall, the niche community that grew in Spain offered the promise of revitalization to 
antifascists at all levels of power. The hopeful momentum that stemmed from the Spanish Civil 
War helped to reignite one of the German left’s most pressing debates: the formation of a united 
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front. From 1936 to 1938, the community of exiles in Spain became the center of attention for 
those who hoped for popular-front unity against Nazism. 
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IV. The United Party 
The Popular Front from Below 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the niche community in Spain served as a meeting 
place for German antifascist exiles. It played an important role in antifascist continuity and 
identity formation, but it also had effects on the political realm. The presence of Germans 
defending the Spanish Republic meant that communists and social democrats fought in the same 
ranks and for the same cause. When the war began in the summer of 1936, Hitler had been in 
power for three years already and no real advancement toward a united antifascist front had 
materialized among party leaders. At a time when social democrats saw Stalin as a threat to 
German sovereignty and communists referred to their counterparts as sozialfaschisten (“social 
fascists”), the active collaboration and solidarity between the Spanienkämpfer tell us a different 
story from what occurred at the party executive level. 
The volunteer soldiers held as a point of pride and purpose the achievement of an 
Einheitsfront von unten (united front from below). As the war progressed, the formation of a 
comprehensive united front against the Nazi regime became an increasingly stronger demand 
from the antifascists stationed in Spain, whether volunteers or party functionaries. These 
antifascists hoped that their unity from below would lead to an official popular front, created 
from the bottom-up. Such an endeavor would put the relationship between Germany’s major 
anti-Nazi parties, the KPD and SPD, to the test. By the time the Spanish Civil War began, there 
had already been over three years’ worth of attempts at uniting the parties. However, as the 
center of German resistance shifted to Spain, those on the ground breathed new life into the 
movement that had seemingly fallen through. 
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The Status of Unity in Exile 
 
 Even before the exile of all political parties other than the Nazi party, many antifascists 
expressed their concern that uniting in a popular front would be the only way to topple the Nazi 
regime. However, though the German left may have shared a hatred of fascism and a high esteem 
for the working class, its two main parties held disdain toward each other. Particularly 
contentious was the question of Germany’s government after the Nazis’ desired fall. The SPD, 
which was the Reichstag’s leading party throughout the Weimar era, promoted participation in 
the existing political system. It rejected the radical positions and anti-establishment stance 
characteristic of the KPD. For their part, German communists had been actively labeling social 
democracy “social fascism” since the KPD’s shift toward Stalinism in 1928.58 The term, which 
Stalin coined in 1924, presented social democracy as an obstacle to a Bolshevik-style working 
class revolution, making it an easy target of communist smear campaigns. The KPD’s influence 
from the Community Party of the Soviet Union undoubtedly contributed to party rhetoric that 
social democracy was the greatest threat to the working class. 
 The KPD and SPD remained lost in their fundamental contradictions. The unforeseen 
consequence was that both parties lost sight of the threat of Nazism. Even when it was clear that 
Hitler would win a plurality of votes in the 1933 Reichstag election, many communists and 
social democrats alike believed Hitler’s win would be an asset. In their view, letting Hitler take 
power would inevitably convince the people that Nazism was based on empty promises, and that 
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soon after a left-wing government would ensure. Stalin himself was willing to bet that the Nazi 
regime would collapse.59 
 If a united front between the KPD and SPD seemed like a capitulation before 1933, its 
importance became clear to leftists after Hitler’s electoral victory. However, pursuing an 
Einheitsfront would require a reversal of the parties’ mutual antagonization of the other as a 
threat to democracy. Party leaders would also have to contradict their own ideals. The SPD 
leadership faced the dilemma of siding with one dictator over another. The KPD’s Central 
Committee understood that promoting unity and the “social fascists” as friends of the working 
class would set a dangerous precedent. Nonetheless, the parties made at least nominal attempts to 
come together against the Nazi regime. The Central Committee of the KPD approved several 
resolutions after 1932 emphasizing the need for immediate unity.60 However, despite several 
closed-door meetings, the KPD continued its attacks on the social democrats and the SPD 
consistently rejected communist advances toward unity. As this chapter goes on to explain, the 
KPD nonetheless rode the wave of growing bipartisan support for a united front, hoping that 
even without official party cooperation, it could still achieve the Einheitsfront from below.61 
 Among the first of the aforementioned top-down resolutions was one put forth on March 
14, 1933, nine days prior to the Enabling Act that gave Hitler the power to act without the 
Reichstag’s approval. The message the Central Committee directed to the SPD was one of 
togetherness against the common enemy, expressing the urgency of their shared situation: 
The leader of our party, Comrade Ernst Thälmann, as well as the leader of the Social 
Democratic Party, but most especially thousands of communist and social democratic 
workers, have been sent to prisons of fascist terror. All communist newspapers and even 
a large portion of social democratic newspapers have been outlawed. Labor unions and 
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workers’ tenements have been stormed and demolished by fascists. Shootings of workers 
‘on the run’ have already begun to take place on a larger scale. Through these means of 
terror, the [Hitler regime] is attempting to gag the working masses to advance its program 
of big capital against the working masses.62 
 
This Einheitsfrontangebot (“offer of unity”) to the social democrats is an early testament to the 
KPD’s stated goal of eventual consolidation among the left. Unlike in later resolutions, after 
parties other than the NSDAP had been outlawed and Hitler had established himself a dictator, 
the party’s message was not militant. Instead, it makes a case for unity as a political solution to 
overthrow the Nazi regime. 
Within a few years, the Einheitsfront evolved from a hopeful aspiration into a crucial 
necessity. The Central Committee’s resolution of January 30, 1935 referred to the Einheitsfront 
as “the most important tool in the development of mass action…”63 By this time, popular-front 
politics had also become Stalin’s priority as he sought to unite all antifascists against Nazi 
Germany, and this was reflected in the KPD’s strategy throughout the following years. At the 
Brusseler Konferenz, the first meeting of KPD officials since their outlawing in 1933, the Central 
Committee laid out its full support of an Einheitsfront between the party executives. Rather than 
reversing its rhetoric that social democracy was equivalent to fascism, the party distinguished 
between the socialist roots of the SPD and what it labeled a “reactionary wing.”64 However, the 
Central Committee’s first attempts at reaching an agreement with their social democratic 
companions in exile were discouraging. On November 23, 1935, Walter Ulbricht and Franz 
Dahlem traveled to Prague to make a plea to the Vorstand, the SPD’s inner circle of exiled 
leaders, hoping to convince SPD delegates Friedrich Stampfer and Hans Vogel to agree on the 
terms of cooperation. While KPD leaders embraced unity from above, the SPD was adamant that 
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an Einheitsfront could not be forced upon constituents. Essentially, the only way toward unity 
would be to consolidate polarized constituencies, and this could only be done if the KPD 
renounced its extremist and revolutionary practices. Unsurprisingly, the talks ended without an 
agreement. The SPD’s response, however, foreshadowed the idea of the united front from below. 
The most notable attempts at a united front at the executive level took place in 1935 in 
Paris, resulting largely from the niche society created there in exile. A center of antifascist 
resistance, the French capital was home to the most communists in exile outside of the Soviet 
Union. On the heels of the French Fronte Populaire’s recent establishment, and in the company 
of thousands of leftist intellectuals, Paris seemed a likely place for the Reich’s most important 
political exiles to reach an agreement. Advocates of the popular front in both the communist and 
social democratic camps gathered delegates to meet at the prominent Hôtel Lutetia, which lent its 
name to the group. 
The Lutetia-Kreis (Lutetia Circle), as it came to be known, brought the two parties at 
least into nominal cooperation toward a united front. In 1936, the organization began to circulate 
its own publication, Deutsche Informationen, which featured articles and texts written by leftist 
authors of various party affiliations. The Lutetia-Kreis was able to agree on relatively basic 
measures opposing Hitler’s militancy and undermining of democracy. Still, most KPD and SPD 
executives remained in different worlds ideologically, despite broad support for the popular front 
among communist and social democratic exiles living in Paris and abroad. For one thing, the 
Central Committee and the Vorstand still could not reach a consensus on what form German 
government should take after Hitler’s defeat. The SPD remained apprehensive in allying itself 
directly with a Stalinist party, and the KPD refused to give up its bitter antagonism toward 
40 
 
Trotskyists, its support for Stalin’s purges and trials, and its revolutionary methods.65 The 
Lutetia-Kreis stalled not long after it began, and by 1938 it had already lost its momentum as 
many writers stopped contributing to Deutsche Informationen and some of its most influential 
members left. Though it inspired genuine hope in many exiled antifascists, it showed that the 
SPD feared a Soviet Germany as much as it did a Nazi Germany, and that the leaders of both 
leftist parties failed to capitalize on the excitement with which many exiles viewed the 
Einheitsfront. It also proved to German antifascists living in exile that, contrary to the lofty 
efforts of their party officials, unity would likely have to emerge from below. 
 
Unity from Below in the International Brigades 
 
As the SPD delegates put forth in their response to the offer of unity, parties could not 
change constituencies. In other words, the united front could not come into existence from the 
top-down. There were still important challenges that prevented the Einheitsfront from 
materializing at the executive level, and the anti-Nazi niche community in Spain realized that the 
experience of de facto unity could reignite the possibility of political unity. It solidified the 
relationship between communists and social democrats as one of common goals rather than 
political rivalry. Though there had been talks toward establishing such a union before the civil 
war, even the most hopeful of these attempts resulted only in basic agreement against Hitler’s 
actions. In Spain, however, unity was not merely an imagination; it was the reality on the ground. 
Though the Einheitsfront from above would not be won so easily, unity from below was an 
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important part of the International Brigades. This experience drove bottom-up efforts to unite the 
parties and inspired hope that the Nazis could be forced out of power. 
 
Reigniting the Push for Unity 
The first major initiative from communists and social democrats in Spain came in 1937, 
after a year and a half of active cooperation during the civil war. In December, a bipartisan group 
of German antifascists wrote to the leadership of both the SPD and the KPD.66 Their letter 
detailed a discussion between German social democrats and communists that took place in 
Albacete. The authors eagerly explained that the meeting resulted in the establishment of a 
committee, which had drafted a series of terms for collaboration between the two camps. To 
convey confidence and urgency, the authors concluded the memo by requesting that the 
recipients pass the enclosed guidelines to all social democrats within contact and formulate a 
joint response. The same message was distributed to various participants and groups associated 
with German antifascists, in the hopes that the various communities in Paris, Prague, and 
elsewhere in exile would help push for the success of unity. 
 However, mirroring previous attempts at uniting the parties, the cleavages between party 
functionaries ultimately challenged this effort. This time, rather than the SPD standing in the way 
of the committee’s approval, it was the KPD. Upon receiving the message from Albacete, Karl 
Mewis, the KPD’s political pommissar in Spain, sent a scathing rejection of the committee’s 
attempt at unity to Ernst Blank, a founding member of the committee who ironically would later 
become the 11th International Brigade’s last political commissar in 1939. But with Mewis as the 
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political leader of the German Brigade, lack of support arose primarily out of political and 
bureaucratic concerns. 
The three issues Mewis identified in his letter provide illuminating insight into the 
challenges of the popular front. Mewis’ first complaint was that the committee had delegated 
Ernst Braun to represent the German social democratic volunteers. According to Mewis, Braun’s 
political alignment was “very unclear.”67 Allowing him to represent the SPD in a symbolic 
unification would therefore be a dangerous political move for the KPD. Mewis’ second issue was 
that the SPD’s representation should not appoint itself. Rather, the KPD would need time to 
monitor the committee’s actions and determine a representation that it could deem acceptable. 
Finally, Mewis stressed that the committee would not end the distrust between the KPD and the 
SPD: 
Do you really think your unity committee will make more of an impression [to the SPD 
leadership] in Prague if you claim yourselves as representatives of all the KPD and SPD 
affiliates in Spain? The executives in Prague are well aware that this is not accurate and 
thus will easily maneuver [these efforts]. The effect of our attempts to thwart [the SPD] 
will be greater if we have committees in various locations and the appropriate 
groundwork is laid before biting off more than we can chew.68 
 
Mewis’ reservations were rooted in his belief that the committee was not representative of the 
political reality outside of Spain. Because the KPD and the SPD had already established 
themselves in two distinct political contexts, it was unrealistic to expect that this event would 
change the nature of their broader relationship. Further, it would not be worth pursuing should it 
undermine the KPD’s image and damage future attempts at a united front. All of these concerns 
point to the fear of losing control—a characteristic typical of communist parties operating under 
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the supervision of the Comintern. The KPD’s Central Committee demonstrated that it would 
only pursue any steps toward unity on its own terms to avoid sending mixed signals to the SPD.  
These challenges did not deter the milieu of German antifascist comrades on Spanish soil. 
On March 13, 1938, the most substantial step toward unity taken from above in Spain arose 
when a committee of thirteen communist and nine socialist delegates convened in Valencia, 
bringing with them the goal of forming a comprehensive, politically viable path toward a united 
front.69 The conference was spearheaded by German volunteers in the 11th International Brigade. 
In a schedule included on the invitation to Valencia Conference, three primary items appeared on 
the agenda. The first reemphasized that unity is the only way toward victory against fascism.70 
The second task was to discuss the significance of victory over Hitler, Franco, and Mussolini in 
the context of the fight for the German masses.71 The third point, as a solution to the KPD’s 
rejection of the Albacete Committee, was to convene a group of 35 Spanish delegates who would 
be tasked with the election of a German Einheitskomitee (“unity committee”).72 This way, the 
representation of the social democrats would not be self-selected, but rather by the delegates of 
the Spanish Communist Party’s Central Committee. 
Though the attempt was more thorough and perhaps more satisfactory from a political 
standpoint, it met a quicker end than its predecessor in Albacete. Of the 35 Spanish delegates 
expected to participate, only 22 attended, forcing the conference to take place without its stated 
intention of reforming a committee. Instead, the conference shifted its focus toward writing to 
the various party leadership and antifascist circles.73 The delegates at the conference also drafted 
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the “Valencia Manifesto”, the final call to German antifascists for solidarity with the Spanish 
Republic and the united front. In failing to effectively establish unity between the SPD and KPD 
leadership in the context of the Spanish Civil War, the conference represented another political 
failure in the progress toward a united front despite popular support from those fighting for 
solidarity in Spain. 
 
Failure in Politics, Success in Practice? 
If one were to review the push for a united front from a top-down approach, it would 
appear as a failure. Indeed, neither the Albacete Committee nor the Valencia Conference 
succeeded in bringing the leadership of the two parties together in the Spanish struggle. 
However, viewing the united front in Spain as moot misrepresents the reality of German 
antifascists in the International Brigades. This oversimplified narrative is a testament to the way 
in which neglecting the bottom of the political hierarchy colors the assessment of history. 
Looking to the experiences of communists and social democrats on the ground in Spain, it 
becomes clear that antifascists collaborated with those of different parties to a closer and more 
profound degree than they had before. In doing so, the unified goal of furthering domestic 
German resistance proved more important to Spanienkämpfer than the points of disagreement 
between the party executives in Paris and Prague. 
 Looking away from individual committees and conferences, accounts from KPD 
members in Spain, both at the top and the bottom of the political hierarchy, suggest that 
communists and social democrats on the ground in Spain and in Germany became more 
supportive of the united front, both from above and below. The guidelines of the KPD 
Parteischule give an indication of how the importance of unity encompassed both the top and 
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bottom layers of the KPD. The Parteischule, which KPD career politicians had organized, 
emphasized in its charter the dire importance of popular front politics.74 To do this, the 
curriculum placed the role of unity in Spain in the larger historical context of the united front as 
an antifascist aspiration. Among the educational material of the Parteischule is a document 
accompanying a lesson on leftist unity. The lesson plan, titled Die Einheitspartei (“The United 
Party”), underscores “the desire of the masses for unity” and that “the unification of the 
Communist and Socialist Parties is the most urgent task at this moment.”75 Further, part of the 
educational material included on-the-ground reports of how workers in an array of German cities 
followed and discussed the Spanish war effort. The reports, documenting sentiment in Berlin, 
Nuremberg, Oldenburg, Düsseldorf, and Breslau, all underscored the hope of German 
antifascists that the experience of unity in Spain would translate to the domestic situation.76 
The Parteischule seems to have successfully conveyed the importance of the united front 
to its students, who represented the working-class ‘bottom’ of the party. In a September 1937 
letter addressed to senior KPD officials Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht, students who had 
recently completed the training program offered praise and insight into what they had learned. 
“Central to our schoolwork were the tasks of the united and popular front in the Spanish [Civil 
War], the task of deepening and broadening the unity among all antifascist forces, and especially 
the role of our heroic and great Communist Party of Spain, which is the leading power of the 
country.”77 The letter illustrates the important role that coalition building played in the context of 
the Spanish Civil War. “For us, the fight in Spain is a vocational school in the politics of the 
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united and popular front.”78 As the writers indicated, antifascists in Spain realized through 
firsthand experience that victory would be impossible without cooperation. However, the letter is 
punctuated with propaganda, which exemplifies the reasons the SPD was reluctant to build a 
united coalition with the KPD. For example, it regurgitates the vitriolic antagonization of 
Trotskyists as “agents of Hitler” from which the SPD Vorstand distanced itself.79 
 Social democrats of the International Brigades also expressed their support for unity. In a 
letter sent to the SPD leadership in Prague in November 1937, one month before the Albacete 
Conference, social democrat and volunteer soldier Salo Glogowski outlined the partisan 
dynamics of the German brigades. He lamented that German social democrats were 
underrepresented in Spain but explained that they shared the same fight as communists and 
socialists—that of German antifascists against the Nazi state.80 Glogowski then detailed how the 
fighters on the ground saw the role of unity in their domestic struggle. “The Italian Socialist 
Party works together with the Communist Party of Italy in the fight against Mussolini, so we 
wonder why the leadership of the SPD does not work in cooperation with the Central Committee 
of the KPD to help our brave, outlawed comrades in Germany and begin taking collective 
action.”81 At the close of his letter, Glogowski states that there is no future for the German 
resistance movement without active collaboration. He even accuses the party of “sectarian 
politics” for not agreeing on a common ground with the KPD at the executive level, referring to 
the obstacles delaying progress toward a united front as Kleinkram (“small stuff”).82 
Glogowski’s message shows the discontent that Spanienkämpfer felt after hoping to model a 
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future united coalition on the experiences of solidarity during the Spanish Civil War. At the end 
of his letter, Glogowski confidently predicted that a united front would arise. However, his 
remark about sectarianism would continue to more accurately characterize the Einheitsfront in 
the years to come. 
The situation in Spain did have a noticeable effect on how the Einheitsfront manifested 
itself in KPD politics. As the war in Spain raged on and the future became ever bleaker for 
antifascists, the political united front between the KPD and SPD never took shape. But on the 
first day of the Valencia Conference, Karl Mewis, now the XI. Brigade’s political commissar, 
delivered a powerful speech on the lasting impact that the pursuit of unity would have. He 
expressed that the solidarity practiced in Spain had set a precedent that would reach the 
leadership of the parties. As Mewis indicated, one can identify differences in the party’s attitude 
toward unity over the course of the Spanish Civil War. Niemeyer notes that, although it was 
communists who had largely organized and attended the conference, the materials published at 
the Valencia conference were more “palatable” to recipients than prior messages.83 This meant 
that there was no communist propaganda, no allusions to a “Red Spain”, and no targeted attacks 
at the leadership of the SPD.84 Niemeyer suggests that the material deliberately avoided 
polemical rhetoric, attesting to its commitment to the united front over its strained political 
relationship. Further, the Central Committee’s attitude toward unity seems to have softened after 
years of pressure from the Spanienkämpfer. Niemeyer’s analysis shows that, in the years 
following the Spanish Civil War, the united front was discussed in a more open and conciliatory 
fashion.85 
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Conclusion 
 
 When the KPD officially agreed that fascism was the greatest enemy of the working 
class, it laid the groundwork for an eventual cooperation with the social democrats. The two 
parties had major points of contention. Among these were the tactics that each party preferred, 
the fear of losing control over their constituencies, and the strategy of organizing a united front 
under exile. But above all, the fundamental disagreement over Germany’s future political 
orientation loomed over the process of building a coalition throughout the 1930s. After years of 
robust but ineffective belief in a united, popular front, the cooperation of German communists 
and social democrats in Spain revitalized the hope that a popular front could arise. Despite 
sincere attempts on the ground to make real progress toward the Einheitsfront as an official 
political union, strategic fears and logistical issues continued to get in the way. 
 Still, despite the political failures of building an antifascist united front at the executive 
level, the experience of Spanienkämpfer from the bottom up reveals that unity was effectively 
achieved at the grassroots level. The union of communists and social democrats manifested itself 
in the military training, community-building, and common goals of the men and women 
sacrificing themselves for the Spanish Republic. By writing to their party officials, organizing 
unity conferences, and fighting for the same antifascist ideals, the Germans of the International 
Brigades are a window into the reality of the Einheitsfront from below as it existed in a Spanish 
context. 
Though it did not succeed in reaching unity at the executive level, the impact of the unity 
between communists and social democrats was felt by KPD functionaries, whose approach to the 
Einheitsfront became more conciliatory than it had been in previous discussions. To say that the 
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Spanish Civil War was a failure in achieving a united front between communists and social 
democrats reflects an oversimplified narrative. It considers unity only from the top down, 
whereas successful unity was not only existent among German antifascists, but tangible enough 
that those in Spain consistently used their experiences as a rallying cry in communicating with 
their party officials. Ultimately, this would not persuade the executive levels to follow suit. 
However, from the bottom up, the united front was actively leading the fight against European 
fascism. 
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V. Epilogue 
 “There are certain events in life that one never forgets.”86 So began Albert Giebel’s 
recollection of the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War. A dedicated resistance fighter, Giebel 
served on the front lines, rose to the rank of lieutenant, and even got married in Spain. He 
remained hopeful until September 1938, when Franco’s forces effectively gained control over 
Catalonia. The loss of connection between the Republican armies there and in Madrid signaled 
the long, painful end of the war. In the next seven months, as Madrid lay under siege and the 
Republic’s fall was imminent, the International Brigades disbanded officially. Survivors of the 
Brigades returned to their countries of origin. For German fighters like Albert Giebel, though, 
there was no home to return to. Many of the demoralized volunteers ended up in prison camps, 
where they often waited in transit before entering concentration camps.87 Nazi forces captured 
Giebel in France during the occupation, whisking him between camps until his final destination 
at the Neuengamme concentration camp in Hamburg. Giebel was luckier than others. While out 
in the work yard, another inmate approached Giebel. “Is that you, Albert?” As luck would have 
it, a fellow Spanienkämpfer by the name of Fritz Perlitz was also interned at Neuengamme. The 
two managed to survive torture, malnourishment, and air attacks. remaining close friends for the 
remainder of their lives. 
 This story, featured in an East German collection of memoirs, strikes me for two reasons. 
Firstly, it brings to life the harsh reality that extinguished the hope of the Spanish Civil War. The 
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Spanienkämpfer, after establishing a vibrant antifascist transplant community and engaging in 
popular-front politics, in many cases lived their postwar days in German concentration camps. 
Others, like Georg Heinzmann, were unable to make it out of Spain when the war ended. These 
prisoners were caught by Franco’s forces and taken to Spanish prison camps, where Nationalists 
treated them especially poorly for having intervened on the wrong side. Giebel’s story is also a 
window into the community of German volunteers as it existed after the civil war. He wrote that, 
of all the political prisoners in the camp, the Spanienkämpfer had it worst. The camp’s wardens 
repeatedly targeted the group, singling them out from the others, for special work assignments. 
On the whole, the band of former volunteers stuck together and often kept each other alive. 
 After their defeat, Spanienkämpfer were targets not only of fascism, but also of Stalinism. 
zur Mühlen notes that, during the postwar show trials and ‘cleansing’ of communist politicians 
from 1948 to 1951, Spanish Civil War veterans were disproportionately sentenced.88 One 
possible explanation is that Stalin did not consider them ‘loyal’ communists. Because of its 
multi-party unity, Stalin may have brushed off the community of former volunteers as 
undedicated communists. As witnesses of the events in Spain, they were also potentially aware 
of the flaws in Stalinist politics. Moreover, the substantial proportion of Jewish Spanienkämpfer 
was susceptible to Stalinist anti-Semitism.89 
 Despite their initial persecution, the Spanienkämpfer held a special place in East German 
society. They were honored as an important part of the history of antifascist resistance. East 
Germans celebrated the anniversaries of the war officially and named streets, public squares, and 
even warships after veterans. Beginning in 1956, the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity 
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Party (SED) awarded the Hans Beimler medal to former Spanienkämpfer, named after the head 
of the Centuria Thälmann and first commissar of the International Brigades. Beimler’s face also 
appeared on stamps and was immortalized in a statue built in Rostock. The Spanienkämpfer 
received commemoration in form of a large statue in East Berlin’s Volkspark Friedrichshain. The 
memory of the veterans within the GDR is a broad topic in itself, but these physical 
manifestations of tribute illustrate the important role that they played in the history of German 
left-wing, popular-front politics. Essentially, the memory of the Spanienkämpfer was a symbol 
not only of East Germany’s past, but also of its present.90 
 Scholarship has often overlooked the important role that the Spanish Civil War played in 
the German antifascist community. As the German antifascist community struggled to find 
methods of meaningful resistance during the mid to late 1930s after the exile of political parties, 
the Spanish Civil War represented a promising opportunity. Realizing the intersection of the two 
antifascist resistance movements, the German left’s attention shifted to Spain. The niche 
community of German leftists continued to grow throughout the years of the Spanish Civil War, 
amassing writers, artists, and intellectuals-turned-political émigrés. Here, German antifascists 
could engage with a wider social milieu while playing an active role in the fight against 
European fascism. From the KPD Central Committee’s perspective, the International Brigades 
provided a chance to recover influence on German communists, both within the Reich and in 
exile. In this niche community, the pursuit of unity between anti-Nazi parties quickly became an 
urgent priority, driving a push for party action from below and inspiring cooperation at the 
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grassroots level. Though the attempts at unifying anti-Nazi parties failed, antifascists in Spain 
revitalized the movement and demonstrated the possibility of popular-front unity. 
Resistance to Nazism was scarce within German borders, and those who were most 
dedicated to the antifascist cause left their country. As Fritz Perlitz commented in his memoir: 
“’Yeah,’ we often heard, ’I would have taken part, too, but there was no way to know how we 
were supposed to get there.’ It makes it sound like we went to the police, picked up our 
passports, got a ticket from Berlin to Madrid, and then took off. It wasn’t like that.”91 Recalling 
Karl Hoetzel’s tale of arriving in Spain, devoted antifascists did not make it to their battleground 
easily. They embarked on dedicated journeys that reflected the urgency of their cause. The story 
of the Spanienkämpfer shows that, to German resistance fighters, Spain’s struggle was their own. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 LArch Berlin, C Rep. 902-02-05 (Nr. 83). 
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